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[L. A. No. 19502. In Bank. Jan. 91,1947.)

G. E. SATTERLEE, Respondent, v. ORANGE GLENN
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY et at,
Appellants.
[1] Negligence-Exercise of Oare.-While the standard of care to
which one must conform is usually that of the ordinarily
prudent or reasonable person under like eircumstanees, the
proper conduct of a reasonable person under particmlar situations may become settled by judicial decision or be prescribed
by statute or ordinanee.
MeX. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, 122; [2, 8] Negligence,
190; [4] Negligence, 191; [5] Negligence, § 150; [6] Negligence,
§ 92; [7] Negligence, § 93; [8] Automobiles, 186; {9] Automobiles,
I S28; {lO] Automobiles, 1843-40.
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(2] Id.-Violation of Statute or OrdiDance.-An act or failure to
act below a statutory standard is negligence per ", or negligence as a matter of law.
[3] Id. - Violation of Satute or Ordinance.-Where the evidence
in a personal injury case establishes that plaintiff's or defendant's violation of a statute or ordinance proximately
eaused the injury and no excuse or justification for violation
is shown by the evidence, responsibility may be fixed on the
violator without other proof of failure to use due eare.
[4] Id.-Violation of Statute or Ordinance-Rebuttal of Presumption.-The presumption of negligence arising from performance of an act in violation of a statute or ordinance is not
conclusive, but may be rebutted by showing that the act was
justifiable or excusable under the circumstances.
[6] Id.-Questions of Law and Fact.-Whether or not a violation
of a statute or ordinance proximately contributed to an accident and whether the violation was excusable or justifiable are
questions of fact except in a ease where the court is impelled
to say that from the facts reasonable men can draw only the
inference that the negligence of .the violator contributed to
the accident.
[8] Id.-Violation of St&tute or Ordinance-Persons Intended to
Be Bene1lted.-A violation of a statute is actionable negligence only as to the persons to whom a duty is owed.
[?] Id.-Violation of St&tute or Ordinance--Oausal Oonnection.In a negligence action predicated on the violation of a statute,
it is necessary to show that the violation was a proximately
contributing cause of the injury.
[8] Automobiles-Oonduct of Operator-Oare at IntersectionsBight of Way.-An operator of a motor vehicle which haa
entered an intersection prior to or at the same time as another vehicle eannot arbitrarily rely on the right of way gained
as a result of excessive speed or by other negligent act or
violation of law.
[9] Id.-Instructions-Oare of Operator-Oonduct at Intersections
-Bight of Way.-In an action for injuries arising out of a
collision of plaintiff's automobile with defendant's school bus
at an intersection, it was not error to refuse an instruction
that plaintiff's violation of the Vehicle Code provisions relating to rights of way at intersections constituted negligence,
[2] Bee 19 OaLJur. 632; 38 Am.Jur. 827.
[8] Right of way at street or highway intersections as dependent on, or independent of, care or negligence, notes, 89 A.L.B.
838; ~ ,6..L.&.1~7. See, also, 2 OalJ'ur. lO-Yr. SUJilP. sao.
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where such instruction did not tender the issue whether the
circumstances were such as to excuse violation, there being
evidence that the bus had increased its speed before reaching
the intersection, and also that the driver did not observe the
automobile until almost the instant of the impact.
[10] Id. - Instructions - Oontributory Negligence - Intersection
CollisioD.-ln an action for injuries arising out of a collision
of plaintiff's automobile with defendant'. school bus at an
intersection, it was error and a miscarriage of justice to give
an instruction which in effect told the jury that defendant
had the burden of establishing plaintiff's failure to act as a
reasonable man under the circumstances although he had violated a statute and such violation proximately caused the
action, since the presumption created by proof of the failure
to comply with the statute relieved defendant of the burden
of proof in this respect.

I

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County. Edward J. Kelly, Judge. Reversed.
Husband's action for damages for injuries and for death of
his wife resulting from an automobile collision. Judgment for
plaintiff reversed.
Tripp, Callaway, Sampson & Dryden, Lowell L. Dryden
and DeWitt W. Manning for Appellants.
William M. Hawkes, Monroe & McInnis and C. M. Monroe
for Respondent.

I

/

EDMONDS, J.-G. E. Satterlee sued to recover damages
for the death of his wife, and also for injury to his person and
property resulting from an automobile collision. The principal
points relied upon as grounds for a reversal of the judgment in
his favor concern two jury instructions stating the legal effect
of violation of the Vehicle Code in fixing liability for the
accident.
At the time the accident occurred, Satterlee, accompanied
by his wife, was driving an automobile in a northerly direction on Citrus Drive. A bus of the school district, operated
by Paul Osteraas, was traveling west on Bear Valley Road toward its intersection with Citrus Drive. From a point about
60 feet south of Bear Valley Road, for several hundred feet
to the south, Citrus Drive had a six per cent ascending grade.
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Bear Valley Road was about level on both sides of Citrus
Drive and the streets intersected at approximately a 90 degree angle. Neither of these roads was a through highway,
although Citrus Drive carried considerably more traffic than
the east and west street. The hard surfaced portion of Bear
Valley Road together with its shoulders, was approximately
29 feet wide; that of Citrus Drive was 32 feet.
As the two drivers approached the corner at about 8 o'clock
in the morning, both of them had a clear and unobstructed
view of the intersecting road for about 600 feet in each direction. The weather was overcast with a drizzling mist, but this
did not affect visibility. Their testimony was in direct conflict as to who first entered the intersection, the relative speeds
at which the vehicles were traveling, and the distance of the
vehicles from the intersection when each operator first observed the other.
Satterlee declared that he was driving at a speed of about
25 miles per hour, and when he was some 75 to 100 feet south
of the intersection he first saw the school bus approaching
from his right. The bus then appeared to be about twice as
far from the intersection. Satterlee continued on at the "same
rate of speed." He said that he thought he had "worlds of
time," that he did not see the bus again until just before the
impact, and that he believed he was in the intersection first
"because I was so far across."
Osteraas estimated that prior to reaching Citrus Drive, I
the speed of the bus was between 30 and 35 miles per hour :
when, at a point about 195 feet east of the intersection, he :
looked to his left and saw the Satterlee automobile. It wa..'l '
then some 300 feet south of the intersection traveling north
at a speed of between 35 and 45 miles per hour. He realized i
that if neither vehiclp slackened its speed the two would reach i
the intersection at approximately the same time, but he expected Satterlee to slow down. He did not see the automobile
again until it was too late to avoid the collision. However,
he was positive that the bus entered the intersection first, .
traveling at a speed of about 20 to 25 miles per hour.
The testimony of four disinterested witnesses casts considerable doubt upon the bus driver's account of the accident.
They quoted Osteraas as saying that he did not see the Sat-.
terleevehicle until just before the collision; also, that he did
not know how the accident happened as the first thing he
knew, the car was in front of him and he did not have time
I
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to stop. According to the evidence, these statements. and other
remarks by Osteraas of like import, were made within an hour
after the accident.
The point of impact, as estimated by the investigating of.
ficer, was approximately one and one-half feet north of the
center line of Bear Valley Road and five feet east of the center
line of Citrus Drive. Brake marks left by the school bus led
up to the point of impact. The marks on the road indicated
that the bus had swerved to the right "after the point of
impact." The left front corner of the bus struck the right
side of the automobile either over the right fTont wheel or
oposite the rip:ht front door.
An instruction requested by the appellants and refused by
the trial court read as follows:
"You are instrncted under Section 550 of the Vehicle
Code. which is the law of the State of Calitornia, provides
as follows:
"Vehicle Approaching or Entering Intersectitm.
"(a) The driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection
shall yield the right of way to a vehicle which has entered
the intersf'ction from 8 different highway.
.. (b) When two vehicles enter an intersection from different hi!!'hways at the same time the drivel' of the vehicle
on the left shall yield the right of way to the drivel' of the
vehicle on the ri~ht.
.. (c) This section shan not apply to vehicles approaching
each other from opposite directions, when the driver of one
of such vehicles is intending to or is makinv. a left turn. Such
movements sha]] be governeo by Section 551.
"I therefore instruct you that if you find under the evidence that the school bUR operated by Paul Osteraas entered·
the intersection before the vehicle operated by the plaintiff, i
then I instruct you that it was the duty of the plaintiff. to .
yield the right of way to the school bus, and a failure so to .
do would constitut.e negli~ence on the part of G. E. Satterlee.
"In accordance with the provisions of this section just
rend to you, I further instruct you that if you find under the
evidence that the school bus and the Satterlee vehicle entered .
the intersection from different highways at the same time, .
and if you further find that the school bus was to the right
of the Satterlee automobile, then I instruct you thnt it was
the duty of the plaintiff to yield the right of way to the school
bus and a failure so to do would constitute negligence.

)
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fryOU are' therefore instructed that if you And under the
evidenoo that the plaintiff violated the provisions of the Vehicle
Code, sueh violation is negligenoo, and if you further find
that such negligenoo if any proximately eontributed in the '
slightest degree to the subsequent accident and injury, then
your verdiet must be in favor of the defendant, Orange Glen
School Distriet of San Diego County and against the plain-';
tiff, G. E. Satterlee."::~
Upon his own motion the trial judge instrueted the jury:
"Now, with referenoo to this matter of right of way. I wish f
to teD you members of the jury that one may have the right ,".
of way and yet be negligent. One caDnot rely on the riJ?;ht,
of way arbitrarily and foroo anyone else oft the highway. He ~
cannot barge in and claim the right of way over one whose .'
approach may be a menace to his safety or to the driver of
that automobile's safety. The same test which I have given
you originally applies in eases on intersections of highways,
regardless of who was in the intersection first, and ~rdlesR
of whieh automobile is on the right, if they approaehed at the
same time; that is. what would a reasonably prudent person
have done under the same or similar circumstances. That ap- -,
plies to both the drivers eo11iding. whether thfJY approach
the intersection at the same time. enter it at the same time,
or one entered the intersection tirst. In other words. these
rules of law are not absolute. They must be considered in
eonnection with what would a reasonably prudent person
have done under the same or similar circumstances • . •
"1 have told you substantially of the rules of law and
gave you what is called the basic speed law. I told you that
when two automobiles enter an intersection at the same time
the automobile or motor vehicle, whether bus or lighter vehicle,
on the right. has the right of way. and if one motor vehicle
enters an intersection before the other, that motor vehicle
has the right of way, but that the right of way is not an absolute riJ?;ht to barge through ignoring any danger to the
other motorist or to the barging motorist. One cannot arbitrarily rely on the right of way and expect to seatter from
his path all of those who have lesser rights. In other words.
the same genera) rule applies. and the test is: What would
a reasonably prudent person do under the same or similar
circumstances' It is possible for one who has the right of
way to be neglilrent in the operation of that unquestioned
right, under a cel'tain set of circumstances."

J
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The appellants contend that in view of their defense of
contributory negligence based upon an asserted violation of
section 550 of the Vehicle Code, they were entitled to an unequivocal instruction in the form requested by them. The
facts of this case, they insist, do not bring it within the rule
that circumstances beyond a plaintiff's control may excuse
violation of the statute. The court's instruction to the effect
that violation of the statute was of no consequence if the
plaintiff acted as a reasonably prudent person would act under similar circumstances is also chalJenged as erroneous.
Theevidenee was evenly balanced upon the issues of n~g
ligence and contributory negligence, say the appelJants. and
as it would support a finding that the bus entered the intersection first, the failure to correctly instruct the jury as to all
of the material issues constituted reversible error.
The position of the respondent is that the proposed instruction gives no regard to the circumstances surrounding the
accident, such as the speed at which the two vehicles approached the intersection, the attention given by each driver
to other traffic, and the respective manner in which the automobile and the bus were operated. Also, the requested instruction does not include as a basis for the jury's consideration circumstances which might properly be considered
as excusing violation of the statute. In conclusion, says the
respondent, the instructioIlR given fully and adequately covered the law applicable to the case.
[1] The standard of care to which ordinarily one must
conform is usually that of the ordinarily prudent or reasonable person under like circumstances. (Civ. Code, § 1714;
James v. Frazee, 209 Cal. 456 [288 P. 784] ; Kelley v. Hodge
Transp. System, 197 Cal. 598 r242 P. 76] ; Scott v. San Bernardino Valley etc. Co., 152 Cal. 604 (93 P. 677] ; Franklin v.
Southern Oal. Motor Road Co., 85 Cal. 63 r24 P. 723] : Richardson v. Kier, 34 Cal. 63 [91 Am.Dec. 681] ; F'l,l.Ch v. Werner,
99 Cal.App. 557 [279 P. 183]; Ohalmers v. Hawkins, 78 Cal.
App. 733 (248 P. 727] ; Rest., Torts, § 283.) But the proper
conduct of a reasonable person under particular situations
may become settled by judicial decision or be prescn"bed by
statute or ordinance.
Traffic rules are statutory standards; for example, a parking requirement (Thompson v. Bayless, 24 Cal.2d 543 [150 P.
2d 413]); direction of traffic on the street (Harris v. John-
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,on, 174 Cal. 55 [161 P. 1155, Ann.Cas. 1918E 560, L.R.A.
1917C 477]); limitation upon speed (B'tl.jamin v. NOOf&(Jn,
207 Cal. 279 [277 P. 1045]); Schming v. C'tl.tral Cal. Traction Co., 115 Cal.App. 30 r1 P.2d 53]); but section 513 of
the Vehicle Code now makes it necessary to establish as a
fact that the operation of 8 vehicle at a greater than prescribed speed constitutes negligence. [I] An aet or fanure to
act below the statutory standard is negligence per .e, or neg·
ligence as a matter of law. [8] And if the evidence establishes
that the plaintiff's or defendant's violation of the statute or
ordinance proximately caused the injury and no excuse or i
justification for violation is shown by the evidence, responsi.
bility may be fixed upon the violator without other proof
of failure to exercise due care. (Thompson v. Bayless,8'Upra;
Wright v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 14 CaUd 168 {93 P.U
135] ; Stein v. Uflited Railroads, 159 Cal. 368 r113 J. 6631;
Cragg v. Los Angeles Trust Co .. 154 Cal. 663 f98 P. 1063,
16 Ann. Cas. 1061]: McKune v. Santn Clara V. M. c.t L. Co.,
110 Cal. 480 (42 P. 9801: Siemers v. Eisen. 54 Cal. 418; Muir i
v. Cheney Bros., 64 Cal.App.2d 55 {US P.2d 138) ; Samuelson .
v. Siefer, 62 Cal.App.2d 320 f144 P.2d 879]; li'er(fU$on v.
Nakahara, 43 Ca1.App.2d 435 r110 P.2d 1091]; Alechoff v.
Los Angeles O. & E. Corp., 84 Ca1.Anp. 33 (257 P. 569] ; Con.
nell v. Harris, 23 Ca1.App. 537 £138 P. 9441; see: Rest., Torts,
§§ 285, 286, 288.)
[4] However, in an emergency, or under unusual eonditions, it is generally held that circumstances may be shown
to excuse the violation. The rule has been aptly stated in
JoUey v. Clemem, 28 Cal.App.2d 55, 67 £82 P.2d 51], where
it was said (quoting from 1 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, § 13): "c... violation of such a statute or ordinance
is presumptive evidence of negligence, which, if not excused
by other evidence, including all the surrounding circumstances, should be deemed conclusive . . .''' Continuing, the
court said: "But unless and until justification or excuse for
sucb conduct appear ... the general rule applies and it must
be treated as negligence per 36." To the same effect if! Oallichotte v. California Mut. etc. Assn., 4 Cal.App.2d 503, 505
[41 P.2d 349], where it was stated: "Violation of an ordinance is negligence per 36. In Alechof/ v. Los Angeles Oa.<r c.t
Electric Corp., 84 Cal.App. 33, 39 [257 P. 569], it is said:
'It is an axiomatic truth, that every person while violating an
express statute, is a wrongdoer, and as such is
necessitate

'3;
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negligent in the eye of the law.' An act which fa performec1
in violation of an ordinance or statute is presumptively an act
of negligence, but the presumption is not eonclusive and may
be rebutted by showing that the act was justi1lable or excusable under the eireumstances. Until 80 rebutted it is eonclusive. (Mora v. PotlillG, 186 Cal. 199, 202 [199 P. 17];
Bath v. Batl.1C8fon, 101 Cal.App. 274, 281 [281 P. 1081].)"
However, the fact which will exeuse the violation of a statute
has been defined by the eourt as one resnltin~ "from eauses
or things beyond the eontrol of the person ehargOO with the
violation." (4 Cal.App.2d at p. 506. See also: TAompson v.
Bayless. supra; Mather, v. County of Ritlerride, 22 Oal.2d
781 [141 P.2d 419] ; PenneSley v. Pacific 9tJa ct Elec. Co., 20
CaUd 141 [124 P.2d 51]; Johnson v. Griffith, 19 Cal.2d 176
[120 P.2d 6]; BerkOtlite v. AmerictJn Bitler GrGtlel Co., 191
Cal. 195 [215 P. 675]; 8quier v. Dow Std. Bread Co., 181
Cal. 533 [185 P. 391] ; Cragg v. Lo, Angelu Tnuf Co., supra;
Shelby v. 80uthern Poc. Co., 68 Cal.App.2d 594 [157 P.2d
442]; Robert. v. Salmon, 66 Cal.App.2d 22 [151 P.2d 556];
Piet, v. Hubbard, 59 Cal.App.2d 124 (138 P.2d 815]; Prucott v. City of OrGnge. 56 Oa1.App.2d 144 [132 P.2d 523];
Pinney v. Wierman, 52 Oal.App.2d 282 [126 P.2d 143];
Henslee v. Po%,25 Oal.App.2d 286 [77P.2d 307]; Scolf v.
Bieler, 11 Cal.App.2d 44 [53 P.2d 868]; Hill v. Peru, 136
Cal.App. 144 (28 P.2d 944]; PrBittJS v. PtJlsmno, 181 Cal.
App. 585 [21 P.2d 993]; Giorgeffi v. WolltJSton, 83 Cal.App.
858 [257 P. 109].)
Thus in Both v. Bankston, supra, where an automobile was
parked partly on the highway in violation of the statute, the
defendant was allowed to show that, despite reasonably eareful
inspeetion, the gasoline supply became exhausted and the ear
stalled. In another ease where a eollision oeeurred with a ear
which had no taillight, evidence that the light was inspected
and found in good order a short time before was held admissible to negative the presumption of negligence. (Berkotlitlt v. AmerictJn Gratlel Co., supro.) And in Mather, v.
County of Ritleraide, supra, this court reversed a judgment
which followed an instruetion to the jury that if the plaintiit
violated section 525 of the Vehicle Code which requires driving as close as praetieable to the right side edge of the road,
she was negligent as a matter of law. "Under all of the
cirCUmstances of the ease," said the court, Uit should have
been left to the jury whether or not the position of her ~r
.

,
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with reference to the white line constituted contnoutory
negligence!' (P. 786.)
A dUferent conclusion was reached where defendant stopped
on the roadway side of a parked car to pennit his wife to
alight. The car behind, in which plainti1! was riding, collided with defendant's vehicle. Defendant's excuse for violation of the prohibition against double parking (Veh. Code
§ 586) was not accepted, the court holding that the positive
mandate of the statute could not be set aside for personal
convenience. (Mason v. Orawford, 17 Oal.App.2d 529 [62
P.2d 420].)
[5] In the application of this rule each violation of a
statutory requirement must be considered in connection with
the surrounding circumstances. Ordinarily, the excuse relied
upon by the violator presents a question of fact for the jury's
determination. As stated in Scalf v. Eicker, avpt'a, p. 54:
"Whether or not a violation of a statute or ordinance proximately contributed to an accident and whether the violation
was excusable or justifiable are questions of fact except in a
case where ' ••• the court is impelled to say that from the
facts reasonable men can draw but one inference and that
an inference pointing unerringly to the negligence of the
plaintUf contributing to his injury.'" (See also: Matker, v.
Oounty of Riverside, .supra; Johnson v. Griffith, avpra; Arez"
lano v. City of Burbank, 13 Oal.2d 248 [89 P.2d 113] ; BerkotJit~ v. American River GraveZ 00., avpra; Prescott v. Oity
of Orange, mpra; Eberl v. Tide Water Assoc. Oil 00.,54 Cal.
App.2d 497 [129 P.2d 135]; Wright v. Ponitz,44 Cal.App.2d
215 [112 P.2d 25]; Mecchi v. Lyon Van &; Storage 00., 38
Cal.App.2d 674 [102 P.2d 422] ; Osgood v. Oity of San Diego,
17 Cal.App.2d 345 [62 P.2d 195].)
[6] But there is, of course, a further question in connection with the issue of negligence. Although a violation of a
statute is not excusable under the particular circumstances of
the case, liability is also dependent upon proof that a duty
was owed to persons in the class of the plainti1! or the defendant who is relying upon contributory negligence. (Bateman
v. Doughnu.t Oorp. of America, 63 Oal.App.2d 711 [147 P.2d
404] ; Figone v. Guisti, 43 Cal.App.606 [185 P. 694] ; Oorbett
v. Spanos, 37 Cal.App. 200 [173 P. 769]; see: Flynn v.
Bledsoe Co., 92 Ca1.App. 145 [267 P. 887]; Rest., Torts, § 286.)
[7] It is also necessary to show that the violation was a
proximatelT. eontributms cause of the in,iur,y. ,(BwiI ,.

.

,
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Bcm1c of CaUfomio., 211 Cal. 548 [296 P. 68); 'Williams v.
Sovlhe,.. PtIC. Co., 173 Cal. 525 [160 P. 660]; Hitstm v.
Dw1/er,61 Cal.App.2d 803 [143 P.2d 952); SMric1c v. GalloVJGf/, 19 Cal.App.2d 693 [66 P.2d 185].)
[8] In the present ease the requested instruction advised
the jury that if the school bus entered the intersection before
the vehicle operated by Satterlee, his failure to yield the right
of way constituted negligence; if the two vehicles entered the
intersection at the same time, and the school bus was to the
right of the Satterlee vehicle, his failure to yield the right
of way constituted negligence; and if Satterlee'. violation
of these Vehicle Code sections proximately contributed in the
slightest degree to the happening of the accident, the verdict
must be in favor of the school district and its driver. But
an operator of a motor vehicle cannot arbitrarily rely upon
the right of way gained as a result of excessive speed or by
other negligent act or violation of the Jaw. (Limlenbaum v.
BtJrbour, 213 Cal. 277 [2 P.2d 161]; StetlefUtm v. I'Uming,
4:7 CalApp.2d 225 [117 P.2d 717]; Miller v. OrofUttm, 41
Cal.App.2d 470 [106 P.2d 963]; Groat v. WtJlkup Df'G1Jage
• • Co., 14 Cal.App.2d 350 [58 P.2d 200]; see: PtJ(Je v. MtJeUi,
213 Cal. 644 [3 P.2d 11); CtlSBelman v. Harlforvl A. .1. Co.,
86 Cal.App.2d 700 [98 P.2d 539] ; PtJttWtm v. C(JtIa'I&tJgh, 18
CalApp.2d 123 [63 P.2d 868,64 P.2d 945]; 136 A..L.R. 1497
supplementing annotation in 89 A..L.R. 838.) [9] And although the instruction correctly left the question of fact of
violation to the jury, it invaded the province of the trier of
fact by not tendering for consideration the issue as to whether
the circumstances were such as to excuse violation. From the
evidence, the jury reasonably might have found that the bus
increased· its speed while traveling the 200 feet immediately
east of the point of impact. If, as stated by Satterlee, when
he observed the bus it was about twice as far from the intersection and traveling at approximately the same speed as his
own vehicle, then he reasonably was justified, the jury could
have concluded, in assuming that the bus would not dangerously increase its speed in order to enter the intersection first.
Certainly by his own act of increasing speed or "racing for
the intersection" an automobile driver should not be allowed
to charge the operator of the other vehicle in the collision
with negligence per 18 without the right to prove ~usti1ication
for the ltatutoq violltim:
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Furthermore, the testimony of distinterested witnesses shows
that the bus driver, having unimpaired visibility, did not observe the automobile until almost the instant of impact. Under
these circumstances it was a question of fact whether Satterlee's violation of the code provisions, if any, was justifiable or
excusable. And although judicial discretion may be exercised
in the adoption of a standard of care for the purpose of imposing civil liability, the refused instruction did not a1Iord the
jury an opportunity to pass upon the question as to whether
the circumstances shown by the evidence a1Iorded excuse or
justification. For these reasons, to have instructed the jury
in the terms proposed by the appellants would have constituted prejudicial error. (See Mathers v. County of Riverside,
81I.pra; Pietz v. Hubbard, 81I.pra; Pinney v. Wierman, 81I.pra;
Marston v. Pickwick 8tages, Inc., 78 Cal.App. 526 [248 P.
930] ; Hagenah v. Bidwell, 46 Cal.App. 556 [189 P. 7991.)
[10] The instruction given by the trial judge upon his own
motion presents a more diflicult question. He refused to adopt
the standard of care established by the Legislature and did
not instruct the jury that violation of the statutory standard
constituted prima facie evidence of negligence which could
be rebutted by evidence of justification or excuse. Instead,
upon the issue of contributory negligence, the court adopted
the reasonable man standard of care exclusively, and allowed
the jury to determine what constituted due care under the
circumstances. The question presented for decision upon this
aspect of the case is, therefore, whether the trial court arrived
at a proper standard.
By the instruction which adopted the reasonable man
standard of care, the jury, in e1rect, was told that the school
district and its driver had the burden of etsablishing the
failure of Satterlee to act as a reasonable man under the circumstances although he had violated a statute and such violation proximately caused the accident. That is not the law.
The presumption created by proof of the failure to comply
with a statute or ordinance relieves a defendant from the
burden of proving that the plaintiff failed to act as a reasonably prudent man. All that the defendant need prove to
establish contributory negligence is that plaintiff's violation of
the statute in question proximately caused the accident. Therefore the burden cast upon the defendant where such violation is relied upon, is more easily established than a failure to
act as would a reasonably prudent man under aimilar circum-

Jan. 1947]

SAT'1'ERLEE 11. ORANGE GLENN SCHOOL DIST.

593

[29 C.2c1 581; 177 P.2c1 279)

. stances. If there was a violation of the applicable statute, the
burden of going forward is then cast upon the plaintiff, if the
defendant is relying upon contributory negligence, to present
evidence justifying an excuse for violation. If the jury does
not believe that the evidence is sufficient to excuse violation,
it must find for the defendant.
For these reasons the adoption by the trial court of the
standard of care imposed by a statute or ordinance becomes an
important factor in imposing liability. The instruction given
by the court on its own motion had the effect of minimizing, if
not completely negativing, the code provision. It was, therefore, erroneous and considering the direct conflict in the
evidence, constituted "a miscarriage of justice" within the
meaning of article VI, section 4% of the California Constitution.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

I

.

,
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TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment. I cannot agree,
however, with the doctrine set forth in the majority opinion
that an act or a failure to act in violation of a statute like the
Vehicle Code is merely "presumptive evidence of negligence,"
which may be rebutted by showing that the act or omission
was justifiable or excusable under the circumstances, with the
excuse or justification a question of fact for the jury. This
doctrine is in effect a modified form of the doctrine that the
violation of a statute (herein used to include an ordinance)
is merely evidence of negligence. Under the ordinary eyidenceof-negligence doctrine the jury, while obliged to consider the
statutory standard, is free to substitute a standard of its own.
Under the majority opinion it is likewise free to do so, if the
one violating the statute offers evidence of excuse or justification. Since it is a question of fact for the jury whether the
excuse or justification is sufficient, the result is that one violating the statute need only offer proof that he acted as a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances, and the jury is
then free to conclude therefrom that he was justified in violating the statute unless "reasonable men can draw but one inference ••. pointing unerringly to .•. negligence."
The statement is frequently found in the cases that an act
in violation of a statute "is presumptively an act of negligence

I
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and while the defendant is permitted to rebut such presumption by showing that the act was justifiable or excusable under
the circumstances, until so rebutted it is conclusive." (Mora
v. Fam1la, 186 Cal. 199, 202 [199 P. 17] j see, also, Berkovitz
v. American River Gravel Co., 191 Cal. 195, 199 [215 P. 675] ;
Dewhirst v. Leopold, 194 Cal. 424, 431 [229 P. 30] ; Harris v.
Johnson, 174 Cal. 55, 58 [161 P. 1155, Ann. Cas. 1918E 560,
L.R.A. 1917C 477]; Rath v. Bankston, 101 Cal.App. 274, 281
{281 P.1081].} The vice of such a statement is that it leaves
to the jury the determination of the e1rect of a statute, a
question of law that properly belongs to the court. Presumptions are used in ascertaining what the facts are, not in· de~
termining what the law is. (See, Wigmore, Evidence, 3d ed.
§ 2490.) If the "presumption" can be rebutted merely by
showing that one charged with violating the statute acted as
a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances, the
controlling standard is no longer the statutory rule, but the
view of the jury as to what constitutes reasonable conduct.
The vital question, presented at the outset, is whether the
statutory standard is applicable at all. If it is, the conduct
of the parties must be measured by that standard, and the
jury is not free to determine what a reasonably prudent person
would have done under the circumstances. If there is sufficient
excuse or justification, there is ordinarily no violation of a
statute, and the statutory standard is inapplicable. If a statute
is 80 drawn as not to be susceptible of such a construction,
80 that it would impose liability without fault, the statutory
standard is ordinarily not an appropriate one in a negligence
ease and should be rejected by the court. (Clinkscales v.
Carver, 22 Cal.2d 72, 75 [136 P.2d 777] ; see Morris, Criminal
Statutes and Tort Liability, 46 Harv.L.Rev. 453, 457.) It is
needlessly circuitous and confusing, and productive of caprice
and conflict in decisions, to instruct the jury that they should
first determine whether the conduct in question fell below
the statutory standard and that they should then determine
whether such conduct was justifiable under the circumstances.
It is a question of law in each ease whether the acts were in
violation of the statute, or excepted therefrom, or if not excepted, whether liability without fault would be imposed by
adopting the statutory standard. It is of course a question
of fact whether the alleged acts occurred.
A majority of American courts have adopted the doctrine
that the violation of a statute constitutes negligence per ,.
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towards persons harmed as a result of acts or omissions eonstituting such violation, if the statute was designed to protect
such persons against that kind of harm, even though the
statute provides criminal sanetions only and makes no reference to eivil liability. (See, James. Accident Liability, 55
Yale L.J. 365, 367; Prosser, Torts. § 39; Thayer, Public Wrong
and Private Action, 27 Harv.L.Rev. 317; Restatement, Torts,
§ 286.) The courts of this state have frequently followed this
doctrine. (Siemer, v. Eisen, 54 Cal. 418, 420; Driscoll v.
Market Street etc. By. Co., 97 Cal. 553, 565 [32 P.S91, 33
Am.St.Rep. 2031: McKune v. Santa Clara V. M. ct L. Co., 110
Cal. 480, 486 f42P. 9801; Benjamin v. NooMn, 207 Cal. 279,
283 [277 P. 1045) : Crag" v. Los Angeles Trust Co., 154 Cal.
663 f98 P. 1063, 16 Ann.Cas. 106]]: Bat7.largcOfl v. Myers,
]80 Cal. 504, S07 f182 P. 371 : Clinkscales v. CaNJer, 22 Cal.2d
72, 75 f136 P.2d 7771: Hopper v. Bulakh, 27 Ca1.2d 431, 434
[164 P.2d 4831 : King v. Cit" of Long Beach, 67 Cal.App.2d
1, 6 {IS3 P.2d 445J: Alechoff v. ~8 Angeles O. ct E. Corp.,
84 Cal.App. 33. 39 f257 P. 5691.}
It is clear that the le¢slative standard is controlling if the
statute expres..<dy provides for civil liability. Confnsion has
arisen in the past from a failure to understand why the legislative standard governs civil liability when the statute prescribes criminal sanetions only. The reason is simply that the
courts under common law principles make the legislative
standard eontrolling and take the formulation of a standard
from the jury, when they find that the eriminal statute has
been enacted not merely in the interest of the community as a
whole but to protect a general class of persons, of which the
party invoking the statute is a member, against the kind of
harm that has been sustained. The decision as to what should
be the controlling standard is made by the court, whether it
instructs the jury to determine what would have been due care
of a man of ordinary prudence under the circumstances or to
follow the standard formulated by a statute. The latter
standard determines civilliabiJity, not because the Legislature
has 80 provided. but because the courts recognize that, with
rCRpeet to the conduct in question, the duties of the parties
are determined by the statute. (The legislative standard may
be eontrolling even in situations in which there is technically
no crime. (Olinkscales v. Oarver,22 Ca1.2d 72. 75 [136 P.2d
777); see, also, Polk v. City 0/ LO$ Angel", 26 Ca1.2d 519,
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541-542 [159 P.2d 931].) If the forbidden eonduct were .
merely evidence of negligence, the jury would be free ot sub.
Btitute its own standard of reasonable conduct, and to approve
conduct that the Legislature has declared 10 dangerous as to
eatl for eriminaJ punishment. "Negligence is failure to aereise the care required by law. Where a statute defines the
standard of eare and the safeguards required to meet a recognized danger, then as we have said, no other measure may be
applied in determining whether a person has earried out the
duty of eare imposed by law. Failure to observe the standard
imposed by statute is negligence, as a matter of law." (Lehman, J. in Tedl4 v. Ellman, 280 N.Y. 124 (19 N.E.2d 987,
990].) "By the very terms of the hypothesis, to omit, willfully or heedlessJy, the safeguards prescribed by law for the
benefit of another that he may be preserved in life or limb,
is to faU short of the standard of diligence to which those who
live in organizedsoeiety are under a duty to conform. • • .
Jurol'B have no dispensing power, by which they may reIns
the duty that one traveler on the highway owes under the
statute to another. It is error to tell them that they have."
(Cardozo, J. in Martin v. Hereog, 228 N.Y. 164 [126 N.E.
814,815].)
Some statutes, such as trafIlc laws, are enacted, not to prevent acts that the community may regard 88 inherently
undesirable, but to prescribe uniform and eertain· rules of
conduct in the interest of safety. Such rules are authoritative
declarations as to how persoDS shan act, and must be observed
because regulations of some kind are essential. "Vehicular
traftic can proceed safely and without recurrent traftic tangles
only if vehicles observe accepted rules of the road. Such rules,
and especially the rule that all vehicles proceeding in one
direction must keep to a designated part or side of the roadin this country the right hand side-have been dictated by
necessity and formulated by custom. The general ue of automobiles has increased in unprecedented degree the number and
speed of vehicles. Control of traffic becomes an increasingly
difficult problem. Rules of the road, regulating the rights and
duties of those who use the highways. have, in eonsequenee,
become increasingly important. The Legislature no longer
leaves to custom the formulation of such rules. Statutes now
codify, define, supplement, and, where changing conditions
suggest change in rule. even change rules which formerly:
rested on custom." {Lehman, J., in Tedl4 v. Ellman, 280 N.Y•

.
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124 [19 N.E.2d 987, 989].) In such a fleld, "when the Legislature has spoken, the standard of care required is no longer
what the reasonably prudent man would do under the circumstances but what the Legislature has commanded." (Tedla
v. Ellman, supra, at p. 990 [19 N.E.2d].)
.An instructive analogy may be drawn between tra.ftl.e rules
and navigation rules designed to prevent collisions at sea. It
is recognized that the navigation rules rather than what the
conduct of a person of ordinary prudence would have been
under the circumstances furnish the standard as to whether
a collision has been caused by negligence of a navigator (Th,
Pennltylvania, 19 Wall. (86 U.S.) 125, 135 [22 L.Ed. 148];.
The SlI.ffolk, 258 F. 219, 221 [169 C.C.A. 287]; BeZelen v.
Chase, 150 U.S. 674, 702-703 [14 S.Ct. 264, 37 L.Ed 1218]),
and that "it is necessary that the courts should rigorously
enforce the collision rules that the object for which they were
framed may be attained." (The 8ti/inder, 275 F. 271. 277;
The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186. 202 [15 S.Ct. 804, 39 L.Ed. 9431.)
This same reasoning should be applicable to the rules of the
Vehicle Code, and this has been the view of the courts of this
state, which have held that conduct in violation of the Vehicle
Code is negligence as a matter of law. (Benjamin v. Noonan,
207 Cal. 279, 283 [277 P. 10451 ; Hurlel v. Albert Cohn. Inc.,
5 Cal.2d 145, 147 [52 P.2d 9221 ; 14hti v. McMenamin. 204
Cal. 415, 418 [268 P. 644]: Bresee v. Los Angeles Traction Co.,
149 Cal. 131, 139 r85 P. 152, 5 L.R.A.N.S. 1059] ; Ferguson
v. Nakahara, 43 CaI.App.2d 43n. 443 rno P.2d 1091]; Re't16S
v. Lapinta. 25 Cal.App.2d 680. 68] 178 P.2d 4651; 8cragg v.
SaUee, 24 Cal.App. 133. 144 f140 P. 7061; Mcu:gedian v.
8wift & Co., 22 Cal.App.2d 570. 572 r71 P.2d 8331 ; Duncan
v. J. H. Corder & 8on. 18 Ca1.App.2d 77, 83 [62 P.2d 1387] ;
see 2 Cal.Jur. Ten-Year Supp .• 226-227; 19 Cal.Jur. 632.) The
Legislature in revisin~ the Vehicle Code from time to time
presumably knew that the courts had established this doctrine,
and in 1943 it expressly recognized the doctrine when it provided in section 403.5 that conduct in violation of the provisions of the Vehicle Code shan not be regarded as "negligence
per se" jf a federal regulation 8uthorize.c; such conduct.
Extraordinary circumstances may ju,<rtify conduct that
appears to violate the letter of a statute but which is impliedly excepted therefrom. if obedience is substantially impossible or deviation from the letter of the statute is necessary
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to serve its purpose. "If a criminal statute or ordinance which
prohibits a particular act is construed to permit such an act
to be done under conditions without criminal responsibility
such an act may be done under the same conditions without
creating civil liability under the statute or ordinance. Many
statutes and ordinances are 80 worded as apparently to express a universal obligatory rule of conduct. Such enactments, however, may in view of their purpose and spirit be
properly construed as intended to apply only to ordinary
situations and to be subject to the quali1ieation that the con·
duct prohibited thereby is not wrongful if, because of an
emergency or the like, the circumstances justify an apparent
disobedience to the letter of the enactment. Thus, the statutory prohibition against parking an automobile on the traveled part of a highway is not applicable to one which h8.fl
broken down and is incapable of motion and thus remains
on the highway while the driver is diligently seeking assist·
ance to remove it. The provisions of statutes, intended to
codify and supplement the rules of conduct which are estab.
lished by a course of judicial decision or by custom, .are often
construed as subject to the same limitations and exceptions
as the rules which they supersede. Thus, a statute or ordinance requiring all persons to drive on the right side of the
road may be construed as subject to an exception permitting
travellers to drive upon the other side, if 80 doing is likely
to prevent rather than cause the accidents which it is the purpose of the statute or ordinance to prevent." (Restatement,
Torts, § 286, comment (c); see Johnson v. GrijJith, 19 Cal.~M
176,180 [120 P.2d 6] ; Mathers v. County of Ritlerside, 22 Cal.
2d 781, 785 [151 P.2d 419] ; Umemoto v. McDonald, 6 Cal.2d
587, 590 [58 P.2d 1274]; Dewhirst v. Leopold, 194 Cal. 424,
431 [229 P. 801 ; Berkovitz v. American River GraveZ Co., 191
Cal. 195, 199 [215 P. 675] ; Cragg v. Los Angeles Trust Co.,
154 Cal. 663, 667 r98 P. 1063, 16 Ann.Cas. 1061] ; Fietz v.
Hubbard, 59 Cal.App.2d 124, 128 [138 P.2d 815] ; Prescott v.
City of Orange, 56 Cal.App.2d 144, 148 [132 P.2d 523] ; Morris v. Purity Sausage Co., 2 Cal.App.2d 536, 540 [38 P.2d
193] ; Pouch v. Werner, 99 Cal.App. 557, 564 [279 P. 183] ;
Dugan v. Fry, 34 F.2d 723; Long v. Steffen, 194 Wis. 179
[215 N.W. 892, 61 A.L.R. 1155]; 24 A.L.R. 1304; 63 A.L.R.
277.) Thus "if some good excuse appears, which would be a
sufficient defense to an action for the penalty imposed by the
law ••• then the law is not really violated!' (Berkotlitz v•

. I
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American Biver GrlWeZ Co., 191 Cal. 195, 199 [215 P. 875].)
"A classic illustration of the same general principle is the
Bologna ordinance against blood-letting in the streets, which
did not make criminals of surgeons." (Edgerton, J., in Boss
v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14, 16; 78 App.D.C. 217; 158 A.L.R.
1870.) A similar exception is expressly formulated in the Navigation Rules as follows: "In obeying and construing these
rules due regard shall be had to all dangers of navigation and
collision, and to any special circumstances which may render
a departure from the above rules necessary in order to avoid
immediate danger." (33 U.S.C.A., § 212, art. 27.) "The duty
is imperative to observe the rules, and to assume that an approaching vessel will do likewise, until after the danger has
become so manifest as to show that there is no proper choice
of judgment other than that of departing from the rules.
Any other course would lead to confusion and be a most prolific source of accidents." (The Piankatank, 87 F.2d 806, 810;
1ntagliata v. Shipowner, ,tc. Co. 26 Cal.2d 865, 377 [15!l
P.2d 1].)
A statute regnlating traffic must be reasonably construed
not only by limiting its e1rect to the situations envisaged when
it was enacted, but also by reading BUch provisions in conjunction with one another and with the rules of the common
law supplementing them. Thus, provisions governing the right
of way at an intersection, by their very nature, apply only
to part of the conduct of each operator of a vehicle. The
safety of operators who meet at an intersection depends also
on the conduct of each of them before he reaches the critical
juncture. An operator who approaches the intersection at
an improper rate of speed, or suddenly increases his speed
before he reaches the intersection, may be at fault even though
he is first at the intersection and therefore under the letter
of the statute entitled to cross it. (Lindenbaum v. Barbour,
213 Cal. 277, 281 [2 P.2d 161]; 8tevefl.8on v. Fleming, 47
Cal.App.2d 225 (117 P.2d 717] ; Groat v. WalkUp Drayage
etc. Co., 14 Cal.App.2d 350, 355 [58 P.2d 200]; see 136
A.L.R. 1497,89 A.L.R. 838.) Again, an operator who reaches
the intersection first after he has properly approached it may
be at fault if he proceeds blindly in disregard of danger that
is obvious. (DOfI,(Jt v. !hilan, 192 Cal. 426, 429 (221 P. 193] ;
Enz v. Jokfl.8, 112 Cal.App. I, 5 [296 P. 115] ; Blackm&re v.
BrenMn, 43 Cal.App.2d 280, 287 [110 P.2d 723] ; see 2 Cal.
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Jur. Ten·Year SUpp. 341.) Since the dut)' of eaeh operator
to observe the right of way rules is imperative, one who arrives at an intersection first may assume that the operator
of another vehicle will obey the rules. (Leblanc v. ClWerdole,
213 Cal. 654, 657 [8 P.2d 312] ; Page v. Mazeei, 213 Cal. 644,
645 [3 P.2d 11]; Eberl v. Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co., 54 Cal.
App.2d 497, 501 [129 P.2d 135]; Atlo.lo. v. Grlmtile, SO Cal.
App.2d 725, 728 [87 P.2d 392]; Couchman v. Snelling, 111
Cal.App.192,195 [295 P. 845); see 2 Cal.Jur. Ten-Year Supp.
338.) One's right to assume that the other will obey the rules
ceases only when the circumStances make it manifest that the
other cannot or does not intend to obey the law; even then the ,I'
one having the right of way is not' at fault unleas by yielding
the right of way, stopping his vehicle, or taking other action, .
a collision could be avoided.
"
The issues in the present case related to the approach of
eaeh operator to the intersection and his conduct at the i
intersection. The bUB driver testified that the bus was approximately 195 feet from the intersection when he first observed plaintitl's car, which was then approximately 300
feet from the intersection; that he was travelling at approxi.
mately 30-35 miles per hour and that plaintitl was travelling
at about 45 miles per hour; that he realized that the two
vehicles would reach the intersection at approximately the
same time if he did not change his speed but that he expected
that the plaintitl, coming from the left, would reduce his
speed. Plaintitl testified that he was travelling at a speed of
approximately 25 miles per hour and 1lrst saw the bUB when
he was approximately 75 feet from the intersection and the
bUB was at least twice that far from the intersection. The
bus driver was at fault if he raced for the intersection or if he
became aware that plainti« would not give him the right of
way and if he could have avoided the collision by yielding the
right of way, stopping or taking other action. Plaintitl was
at fault if he approached the intersection at improper speed
or observed that the bus would reaeh the intersection first or
at the same time as he wl>U1d. If the bus driver approached
the intersection at a proper rate of speed and could not antici·
pate that plaintitl would be there first, the issue became important whether the bUB driver perceived that there was a
manifest danger of collision to be avoided by his yielding the
right of way, stopping, or taking other action to avoid the
tol1
In t1Us respect his testimOIl1'. that he knew that

aoa.
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a collision was inevitable when plainti«'. ear was about 40
feet from the interaeetion, was important. It must also have
been clear to the plainti« that the closer he came to the intersection the more he had to be certain that he did not have
"worlds of time" as he allegedly thought when he first IILW
the bus.
The jury should have been instructed in accordance with
the foregoing rules.
The trial court'. instruction, qouted in the majority opinion,
did not advise the jury that the question as to who was at
fault was to be determined under the right-of-way provisions,
if both cars properly approached the inte.rseetion and one
was there first or one car came from the right, if they both
arrived at the intersection at the same time. The instruction
was inadequate in not advising the jury that one cannot gain
the right of way by racing for it or otherwise violating the
law. The efreet of the instruction was to advise the jury that
the provisions of the Vehie1e Code dealing with the right of
way were of.no consequence, and that if an ordinary prudent
person under the circumstances would have fiolated the
statute, the violation was excused. Instead of deacn'bing the
scope of the statutory standard the court rejected that standard and in its place adopted the reasonable man standard,
leaving it to the jury to determine what was proper conduct
under the circumstances.
In cases of this IOrt the choice of the wrong theory, either
as a basis of instruction to the jury or as a rule of decision
for the trial court sitting without a jury, may have serious
consequences. Any doctrine that allows uncontrolled dise.reti.on in the jury or trial court to disregard statutory
standards cannot fail to bring about a aimilarc1isregard of
the standards by those whose conduct is regulated.

!
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J

i

CARTER, J.-I dissent. The issue in this case is whether or
not a purported violation of the traffic law right of way at
intersections (Veh. Code, § 550) eonstitutes negligence per .el
that is, whether the court should adopt it as the invariable
standard of care or the teat should be that of the conduct of a
person of ordinary prudence. The latter is preferable for the
reason that the rule is not capable of precise application.
A violation of the rule mayor may not be negligence depe-n.ding upon the circumstance.. That is eonceded by the
opiDion prepa:red by Justice Edmonds and is supported by the
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authorities. It is clear that there may be factors indicating
that the violation of the rule may not be negligence, such 18
excuse, emergency, justification, the speed of the vehicles,
and their distance from the intersection and the nature of the
intersection. (See Mather, v. Oounty of BitJerBide, 22 Cal.
2d 781 [14:1 P.2d 419]; Lindenbaum v. Barbour, 213 Cal.
277 [2 P.2d 161]; 8tetJBMon v. Fleming, 4:7 CaI.App.2d 225
[117 P.2d 717]; Miller v. Crandon, 4:1 CaI.App.2d 470 [106
,
P.2d 963); Groat v. Walkup Drayage etc. Co., 14 Cal.App.2d
,,
350 [58 P.2d 200].) Being dependent upon the circumstances
in the particular ease, we have nothing more, in ettect, than
an application of the ordinary prudence standard, and the
provision of the statute should not be made an absolute standard for the determination of either the issue of negligence
or contributory negligence. The right of way rule does not
lend itself to practical application. It is only in the rare""
theoretical situation that it can be applied. It must be suP..:i
posed that the two vehicles are travelling at the identical speed
and enter the intersection at precisely the same time; and
that the view of oncoming vehicles is equal to both drivers.
There must be no disturbing elements or sudden emergencies.
Justice Edmonds treats the matter 18 creating a prima facie
case of negligence and then shifts the burden of going forward to the opponent to show exculpatory circumstances.
That leads only to confusion of the jury. If there may be
such circumstances then the test actually being used is the
conduct of a person of ordinary prudence. Hence the jury
should be 80 instructed thus avoiding the complication of
shifting the burden of proceeding which must inevitably re-'
sult in confusion.
The majority opinion states: "The presumption created
by proof of the failure to comply with a statute or ordinance
relieves a defendant from the burden of proviJig that the
plaintift failed to act 18 a reasonably prudent man. .All that
the defendant need prove to establish contributory negligence
Us that plaintift'a violation of the statute in question proximately caused the accident. The burden cad upon the defendont wher. IUCh violation " relied upon, " therefor. more
etm"ly "tablished thon a failure to act CIB would 0 rBGSOMbly
pl'lU.ient man under "milar circumda1l.CBI. If there was G
violation of tM appUcable stotute, tM burden of going forward is then cast upon tM plaintiff, if the defendant" relying upon CQutf'ibvtDf'JI .egUvence.
Feae'" ,vidence jUl-
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li/lIing anta:cuse lor molation. If the jury does not believe
that the evidence is su1!icient to excuse violation, it must find
for the defendant." (Emphasis added.) The foregoing statement will not bear thoughful analysis. After stating that:
"All that the defendant need prove to establish contributory
.negligence is that plaintifi's violation of the statute in question proximately caused the accident," the opinion states:
"The burden cast upon the defendant where such violation
is relied upon, is therefore more easlly established than a
failure to act as would a reasonably prudent man under similar cireumstances." Why this result obtains does not appear.
We may assume that all available evidence relative to plaintUf's conduct will be o1Iered, and it is for the trier of fact to
determine from such evidence in the light of the applicable
statute whether such conduct was that of a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances. If it was, it cannot
be said that plaintifi was negligent even if he did violate
said statute. The opinion then states that if there was a violation of the applicable statute, lithe burden of going forward
is th.n cost "pontM plaintiff . • • to present ttJidenc6 justi/1Iing an tll:CU86 for tJiolation.t' (Emphasis added.) If. as asserted in the majority opinion, the violation of a statute or
ordinance which is a proximate cause of the accident is negligence per S6, how can such violation be excused or justified'
It clearly appears from the discussion in the majority opinion
that it is the position of the majority that the violation of a
statute or ordinance is not negligence per 86 unless it is a
proximate cause of the accident. It should follow that if such
violation is a proximate cause of the accident. it cannot be
excused or justified so far as civil responsibility is concerned.
That is to say, that if a defendant has violated a statute or
ordinance, and such violation is a proximate cause of an accident, he is liable in eivil damages for 811y injury which may
fiow therefrom. Contributory negligence will not defeat reeovery by plaintiff unless it contributes proximately to the
happening of the accident. Therefore, in order to hold that
the violation of a statute or ordinance by plaintiff constitutes
contributory negligence, it must first be determined that such
violation was a proximate cause of the accident. If it was
a proximate cause of the accident, it cannot be excused or
justified. Ho,vever, the majority opinion purports to lay down
the rule that the violation of a statute or ordinance may be a
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proximate cause of the accident, and therefore constitutes negligence pe,. 8e, and yet may be exeused or justified. Such a
rule can only lead to confusion worse confounded. How such
a rule can be applied in a trial forum is difficult to understand. Negligence eases are presented by the plaintiff first
milking out a prima facie ease of negligence on the part of
the defendant whieh was a proximate cause of the accident.
The defendant then presents JUs defense by attempting to
show absence of negligence on his part or contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. When the evidenee is concluded the court instructs the jury that so far as the burden
of proof is concerned, such burden is on the plaintiff to prove
defendant's negligence and the burden is on the defendant
to prove any contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff
unless such contributory negligence affirmatively appears from
the evidence presented by the plaintiff. Aecepting the theory
advanced in the majority opinion that the violation of a stat·
ute or ordinance is negligenee pe,. .e, and assuming that there
was evidence of a violation of a statute or ordinanee by either
party, the court could very simply instruct the jury that if
they believe that either party was guilty of a violation of a
statute or ordinance and that such violation was a proximate
cause of the accident the violator was guilty of negligence
pe,. .e unless such violation was excused or justified. This is,
in effect, what the trial court did in the ease at bar except
that it added that a person who violates a statute is not guilty
of negligence if he acted as a reasonably prudent person, which
is the equivalent of saying that the violation was excused or
justified. There is no basis in such a ease for talk about the
"burden of going forward," or that it is easier to establish
contributory negligence by proving that plaintiff violated
a statute than to prove that his conduct was not that of a
reasonably prudent person, as all of the evidence has been
already introduced and the function of the jury is to weigh
that evidence and arrive at a conclusion based upon the law
contained in the instruetions of the court.
This court has recognized that eriminal statutes Bueh as
traffic laws are not always accepted as approximate standards
in civil actions for negligence. (Hoppe,. 1'. Bvlaich, 27 Cal.
2d 431 [164 P.2d 483]; Olink.cale. 1'. Oartler, 22 Cal.2d 72
[136 P.2d 777]; Mathe,., v. Oount" of Rive,.side, 22 CaJ.2d
781 [481 P.2d 419].) In the Mathers ease, involving the traf·
1iee law (Veh. Code, § 525) requiring that a car be driven
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as near the right hand curb as practicable, this court in hold·
ing erroneous an instruction that the violation thereof was
negligence as a matter of law stated (p. 786): "Under all
of the circumstances of the case it should have been left to the
jm'~' whether or not the position of her [plaintiff's] car with
T'f'fprence to the white f center1 line constituted contributory
l1t'gligcnce. "
It should be obvious that the moment the absolute standard,
which makes violation of a statute or ordinance negligence
per 8e, is relaxed. by pennitting a showing of excuse. justi.
fication, emergency, etc.; the inevitable result is that the issue
of negligence is determined by the trier of fact giving consid.
eration to evidence relating to the conduct of the parties.
While the standard provided in the statute or ordinance is
a factor to be considered. the ultimate fact to be determined
is whether or not the person charged with negligence or contributory negligence failed to exercise that degree of care
which a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under similar circumstances. Hence, the standard appJied is the
conduct which would be expected of a reasonably prudent
person. Experience has shown that this is the standard applied
by juries in the general run of negligence eases. Little heed
is given to technical and artificial l!tandards which have no
practical application, as jurors are familiar with traffic rules
and are more capable of applying them to the facts of a particular case than the members of this court.
For the reasons above discusesd a violation fo the traffic
law right of way as constituting negligence pe,.'6 is peculiarly
inadequate to test civil liability, and the instruction in the
ease at bar applying the test of a reasonably prudent person
W3!'! proper.
The judgment should be affirmed.
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